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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DODGE TOWN, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
VERNON B. ROMNEY, Attorney General,
Stale of Utah, GORDON B. CHRISTENSEN,
County Attorney, Salt Lake County,
and DELMAR L. LARSON, Sheriff of
Salt Lake County,
Defendants and Respondents

Case
No. 12044

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Dodge Town, Inc., a licensed motor vehicle
<lealer, filed suit to obtain a declaratory judgment which
would adjudge SB-128 of the 1969 Legislature, appearing as
Sec. 76-.5.5-5, 6 and 7 in the Supplement to Utah Code Annotated 19.53, to be unconstitutional, and by motion sought a
temporary injunction to restrain enforcement of the statute
pending a trial on the merits.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, granted
plaintiff's motion for temporary injunction, under date of
June 30, 1969. Following a trial on October 20, 1969, before
the Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, the statute was held to
be constitutional. On February 27, 1970, the District Court
entered a declaratory judgment holding the act constitutional, and vacated the temporary injunction.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the final judgment of
the District Court, dated February 27, 1970, which adjudged '
the motor vehicle dealer Sunday closing law to be constitutional.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
While some facts are correctly stated in Appellant's
Brief, most of the material facts which support the findings
of fact, conclusions of law and the judgment are omitted.
Some statements made by appellant contradict the undisputed facts. On page 4 of its brief, appellant asserts:
"2. The statute does not prohibit everyone from selling licensed 'motor vehicles on Sunday.' The statute only
prohibits licensed dealers from making such sales. No
one else is prohibited from selling motor vehicles on Sunday."
Similar statements are made throughout Appellant's
Brief. The Motor Vehicle Code as amended, Sec. 41-3-6,
U. C. A. 1953, requires every dealer in new or used motor
vehicles to obtain a license. A dealer is defined by Sec.
41-3-7 as last amended in 1965 as one engaged in the business of selling or exchanging new, or new and used, or use<l
motor vehicles and who buys and sells or exchanges three
or more motor \·chicles in any 12-month period. Sec. 41-3-27

1

3
declares that any one who violates any of the terms and
pro,·isions of the act is guilty of a misdemeanor. Sec. 41-3-6
prohibits e\·ery person from operating as a motor vehicle
dealer if he has no license. An unlicensed motor vehicle
dealer is prohibited from operating on Sunday and each and
e\'ery week-day.
Respondents also disagree with the appellant's statement
on page :3 that the 'statute only prohibits sales on Sunday of
motor Yehicles which are 'required to be licensed'" and that
"all other motor vehicles can be sold under the statute." The
statute contains no such exceptions.
By paragraph 5 of its complaint, Dodge Town, Inc. specified the alleged grounds of unconstitutionality of the statute.
( R. 2-3). By its motion for a temporary injunction to restrain
enforcement pending determination of the constitutionality
of the statute, plaintiff claimed "irreparable damage."
( R. 2.3-24). Defendants filed their answer prior to hearing
on the motion, denying most of plaintiff's claims, including
a\'crments of unconstitutionality and claims of irreparable
damage. Defendants also alleged that plaintiff's claims for
<ledaratory relief relate to matters which should be addressed
to the Legislature, not to the courts. Defendants denied all
allegations of the affidavits execpt those specifically admitted. Defendants charged failure on the part of plaintiff
to state facts constituting a claim for judicial relief or for
temporary injunction. Defendants also pleaded that the
temporary injunction sought by plaintiff would constitute
an exemption of plaintiff from criminal prosecution for violation of the statute even if the statute is held constitutional.
( R. 36-38).
Plaintiff off erecl no evidence in support of the several
affidavits as to 'irreparable injury" at the hearing on the
motion for temporary injunction. Plaintiff's manager did not
appear for interrogation or cross-examination. The proposed

4
temporary injunction was not sen-eel on the Attorney General. ( R. 112-113). There were delays iu getting the case to
trial on the merits. Trial was conducted by the Honorable
Aldon J. Anderson on October 20, 1969. The trial judge held
that the statute is constitutional, and that judgment be entered accordingly and that the temporary injunction be dissolved. ( R. 231-239). Findings of fact, conclusions of law
and proposed judgment were served prior to the filing of
plaintiff's motion for an expanded judgment, and entered
February 27, 1970. ( R. 282-288).
Inasmuch as appellant omits most of the undisputed
evidence which supports the findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment, and does not state the evidence fairly and
accurately, the material evidence not mentioned by appellant, is now briefly summarized.
Burt L. Curtis, a real estate broker testified that most
sales of real estate are made on Sunday because there is no
statute prohibiting Sunday sales. However, he stated that
he regarded the real estate business as an entirely different
business from the motor vehicle business. ( R. 308-309).
Robert 0. Bennett, a Salt Lake City police officer in the
traffic division, found that traffic around auto dealer places
of business was light on Sunday, Saturday being the busiest
day. ( R. 314-31.5). He did not check to find out why auto
dealers are closed on Sunday in Salt Lake City. ( R. 318L
John Norman Everett, assistant \'ice-president of Heber
Grant & Co., testified that his company writes automobile
insurance for U. S. F. & G. ( R. 322). The offices are dosed
on Saturdays and Sundays. There are over 300 agents in
Utah. Some agents are at automobile agencies. He admitted
that there is no agent at every automobile dealer in Utah
to write insurance. He said that if an application for insurance is put in the mail it will be accepted or rejected on its
receipt. Agents can issue binders after hours and on Sw1day.

J.
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If a purchaser of a new automobile does not get his application for insurance in the mail, even under an arrangement
existing at Capitol Chevrolet, he would not be covered.
( R. 322-327) .
It was stipulated that the County Recorders' offices, and
Secretary of State's office and the Tax Commission Motor
Vehicle Registration Division, are open only non-holiday
week-clays, Mondays to Fri<lays from 8:30 A.M. until 5 P.M.
( R. 327-328).

Exhibit P-5 consisting of classified ads in The Salt Lake
Tribune for a period of one week, does not show nor was
there any testimony to indicate, just how many private
sales were consummated on Sundays by individual owners
of motor vehicles. ( R. 328-329).
Donald K. Richards, president and manager of Dodge
Town, Inc., who signed the several affidavits in connection
with the motion for temporary restraining order, has been
engaged in auto dealerships for 15 years. He was with Johnson Lincoln Mercury for eight years, Lake Motors in 1966,
and a substantial owner of Rancho Rambler for 5 years.
( R. 330-3:32). He said very few sales are made on Sunday at
downtown locations. Saturday is the biggest day. ( R. 322333). No title papers are submitted on Saturdays and Sundays because the State Motor Vehicle Registration Department is not open on those days. ( R. 334-.336). He admitted
that he signed affidavits in the case file; that he stated therein that at various time he kept places of business open in
Salt Lake City on Sunday. ( R. 340-342). He admitted that
he knew that for more than 15 years Salt Lake City had an
ordinance prohibiting Sunday sales. ( R. 343). He said he
did not consider it unprofitable to operate on Sunday because of the possibility of prosecution and fine for violation
of such ordinance. He said he did not pay much attention to
the ordinance because he felt other dealers were doing the
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same thing; that Sunday sales and deli\ ery of cars on Sundav
'bad been a joke." ( R. .344-345).
.
Copies of the radio and T. V. advertising scripts for
Dodge Town, in the
file, were introduced as part of
Exhibit D-6. The scripts advertise Dodge Town as being
open on Sunday, when
Richards knew other dealers
were closed on Sunday. ( R. 124-1.54, 34.5). ;\Ir. Richards
said he has opinions, but not records of "irreparable injury."
( R. 346-348). He said that sales were lower during the
period of time Dodge Town was closed on Sundays, due to
general economic conditions. Over a four-week period,
Sunday sales were a little more than half the dollar amount
of Saturday sales. ( R. 349-350).
Plaintiff's place of business opens at 7:30 A.M. The
service department closes at 5:30 P.M., but the sales department stays open until 10:00
sometimes later. Salesmen report at 9:00 A.M. Half the sales force stays until
3:00 P.M. The other half generally stays from 3:00 P.M. to
10:00 P.M. ( R. 350-352). Salesmen work 6 hours per day,
seven days per week. They work on a commission basis.
On deposition he testified salesmen work as much as 48
hours per week. ( R. 352). When recalled he testified that
salesmen do not come under the \Yage and Hour Law as
far as overtime is concerned. If salesmen worked 50 or 60
hours a week there would be no overtime pay. He did not
find out just how many hours salesmen work at Dodge Town.
( R. 382-386). During the period Dodge Town was closed
on Sundays, sales were down because the company did no
advertising. ( R. 383).
Mr. Richards said he does not know of any unlicensed
motor vehicle dealer who is permitted to sell vehicles in
Utah. ( R. 354). During the period of ;\lay and June 1969
when Dodge Town was closed on Sunday, every other
dealer also was closed on Sundays. None of plaintiff's com·
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petitors got any of the sales plaintiff was unable to make on
Su11<lays. ( R. 361-362).
Defendants presented two witnesses. John Burt, director
of the
Vehicle Business Administration of the State
Tax Commission, testified that said division was charged
'' ith enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Code, to issue licenses, and investigate complaints of fraud and stolen vehicles. His office investigates theft rings and thefts, also
stolen automobiles are sold generally
fictitious titles.
through automobile dealer agencies because of the opportunnity to get finance right away. ( R. 366-368). His office
is closed on Saturday and Sundays .. There is a relationship
between closing down the sale of motor vehicles on Sundays
and investigation and apprehension of auto thefts. The
more time the unscrupulous operator has who possesses no
license, the more time he has to escape detection. Mr.
has had experience for 15 years in apprehension of auto
thefts and theft rings. There are 10 employees working under
him, with 6 investigators including himself.
Based on his experience, Mr. Burt was of the opinion
that professional auto thieves and unauthorized auto dealers would have an extra day to escape detection in dealing
with motor vehicles to which they have no titles and which
may have Leen stolen, if dealers are allowed to stay open on
Sundays. There would be an extra day to escape detection.
His office also investigates unlicensed dealers. ( R. 368-370).
Exhibits D-7 to D-15 are rules promulgated to protect
the public and to have all persons engaged in business as
automobile dealers bonded and licensed. Regulation 1 was
adopted to require each dealer to report each sale made
each day to the State Tax Commission as required by Sec.
41-1-73.
A sale on Saturday or Friday night is as bad as a Sunday
sale. Staying open either Saturday or Sunday gives a thief
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more time to operate. If the business is closed clown one of
those days so a sale or an exchange cannot be made, it
reduces the hazard. ( R. 373-376).
Dale S. Brown, assistant director of the Motor Vehicle
Business Administration, has charge in the absence of the
director. His office works closely with the sheriff's offices
and police departments for apprehension of thefts. His
testimony would be the same as that of John Burt on matters to which .r..tr. Burt testified. ( R. 377-378). His office
receives a copy of the reports of sales of motor vehicles from
dealers. He prepared a tabulation of sales reported by Dodge
Town, Inc., Exhibit D-16, for the period of January 5, 1969,
to August 30, 1969, CO\ ering 29 weeks, excluding the fil'e
weeks when Dodge Town was closed on Sundays. ( R. 379381). Said exhibit admitted in evidence, shows the following
number of Yehicles sold each clay of the week in the aggregate during the 29 weeks tabulated: Saturdays 215, Sundays
98, Mondays 131, Tuesdays 104, Wednesdays 78, Thursdays
98, and Fridays 123.
By stipulation a certified copy of Section 20-25-3, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965, relating to Sunday
closing as to automobile sales, was to be furnished to replace the one lost, to be treated as an additional exhibit on
behalf of defendants. ( R. 389). See case file. ( R. 259-A).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
STATUTES ARE PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL THE CONTRARY IS
CLEARLY SHOWN, AND PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PRODUCE THE REQUIRED PROOF OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.
At the outset, Dodge Town, Inc. recognized that it could
not show that Senate Bill 128, enacted by the 1969 Legisla·
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t11rc, is unconstitutional on its face. It filed a motion for a
temporary injunction to restrain enforcement pendente lite,
predicated 011 the unsubstantiated contention that "plaintiff
\rill be irreparably damaged" if such temporary injunction
\\'Crc not issued "pending a final hearing" on the complaint
for declaratory judgment.' R. 1-4, 23).
Before specifying with particularity wherein the appellant misstates the facts and the law, and misinterprets the
constitutional provisions on which it claims to rely, reference
is made to the long line of decisions of this Honorable Court
and of some other courts on the proposition that statutes
are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly
shown. Respondents then point out not only the failure of
proof on the part of appellant, but the attempts to read into
the challenged statute exceptions which are non-existent,
and the endeavor of appellant to have the courts suspend
constitutional rules by substituting the judgment of the
courts for the judgment and policies of the State Legislature.
In State vs. Sopher, 25 Utah 318, 329, 71 P. 482, this
Court said:
" " " " All presumptions are in favor of the validity
of a statute, and unless the courts can clearly say that
the Legislature has erred the act should stand, and the
prerogatives of the legislature not encroached upon.
Courts may interpret, construe, declare, and apply the
law, but may not usurp the functions of the lawmaking
power by assuming to interfere with or control the legislative discretion."
Appellant cites Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.

2d 939, at pages 17 and 21 of its brief, which involved a

general Sunday closing law with numerous arbitrary exceptions and exclusions, as distinguished from the challenged
industry-wide Sunday closing law without any exceptions.
In that case this Court declared:
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"In determining constitutionality, statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the contrary is clearh
shown. It is only when statutes manifestly infringe
some constitutional prO\·ision that they can be declared
void. Every reasonable presumption must be indulged
in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of wnstitutionality." (Cases cited).

In that case this Court also declared:
"The Legislature has a wide discretion in determining
what shall come within the class of activities permitted
(on Sundays) and what shall be excluded, and in determining whether such classification is constitutional.
"A court is not concerned with the wisdom or policy
of the law and cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the legislative body, and if reasonable minds might differ
as to reasonableness of a regulation, the law must be upheld."

In the more recent case of Trade Commission v. Skaggs
Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 P. 2d 958, this
Court made some pertinent statements and emphasized some
guiding principles:
"An alleged violation of the Constitution must be of a
specific provision of a particular article thereof. We have
repeatedly held in order to be declared unconstitutional,
the statute must clearly \'iolate some constitutional provision, and further, the violation must be clear, complete
and unmistakable."
In explaining some of the guiding principles, this Court
said:
"The first is that the legislature of the State is not a
government of powers limited to those expressly granted,
as is the federal government (as the federal Constitution
says, but is gradually being eroded away). The legisla·
ture of the state, which represents the people and thus
the soverign, has all of the residuum of power of govern-
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ment, except only as expressly restricted by the Constitu·
tion. In order to presef\'e the independence and the in·
tegrity of the three branches of government, it is of the
utmost importance that the judiciary exercise restraint
and not intrude into the legislative prerogative. It cannot strike down and nullify a legislative enactment unless
it is clearly and expressly prohibited by the Constitution
or in \ iolation of some plain mandate thereof. The Court
must make e\ ery reasonable presumption which favors
constitutionality. The courts have a duty to investigate
and, insofar as possible, discover any reasonable avenues
by which the statute can be upheld. Every reasonable
doubt must be resolved in farnr of the constitutionality
of the statute. Those who assert, the invalidity of the
statute must bear the bmden of showing it to be unconstitutional."
" " " " It does not lie within the province of the court
to pass upon the wisdom, the need or the desirability of
any legislation, nor to choose between two opposing
political philosophies. It is not the function of the court
to ameliorate the conditions of those in want, nor is its
purpose to solve the economic, social or religious problems and dissensions which beset society. The court is
not the conscience of the State or its people. It does not
fall within its duty to express the personal desires or
philosophy of its personnel."
"The court must \·oluntarily restrain itself by holding
strictly to an exercise and expression of its delegated or
innate power to interpret and adjudicate. \Ve have been
called upon to state what the law is and not what we
think it should be. The question as to whether the statute
in question is or is not economically sound or beneficial
is not for the court to decide, but such an inquiry is a
matter for the legislature. The only question for us is to
determine whether or not the particular statute in question is constitutional."
Under Point I of its brief appellant argues that "THE
TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE
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STATUTE IN QUESTION IS NOT AN UNREASONABLE
EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TO REGULATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES." Contrary to the adjudicated cases, Dodge Town
attempts to fasten upon respondents the burden of showing
that the statute is constitutional, notwithstanding appellant's failure to prove violation of a specific: pro,·ision of the
constitution. In quoting from 16 Am. Jur. 2<l, Constitutional
Law, sec. 314, page 614, on pages 6 and 7 of its brief, appellant fails to quote the foIIowing pertinent statements on
pages 612 and 613 which precede the portions quoted by
appeilant:
"Lawful pursuits.

"Lawfulness of a cailing is not necessarily a criterion
of exemption from police regulation. The power is not
confined to the regulation of such classes of business as
are essentiaily illegal, for it extends likewise to lawful
cailings. The right of reasonable regulation is a modification of the sweeping generalization that every person has
a right to pursue any lawful cailing. \Vhen any business,
lawful in nature, is such that it may be conducted in such
a way as to become harmful to the public or when supervision is necessary to confine it to legitimate channels,
the state has a right to throw around it such safeguards
as will fuily protect the public. " " " "
Appeilant then complains on page 7 that the trial court
"did not identify the public interest which was being
protecte<l when it held that the statute is an industrywide regulatory statute, and constitutes a valid exercise
of the police power of the State for reasonable and ap·
propriate regulation of the motor vehicle business."
Inasmuch as the appcilant had the burden of proving
unconstitutionality, the trial comt had no duty to negatiw
plaintiff's unpro,·cn claims. On pages 8 and 9 of Appellant's
Brief it is contended that the reasoning iu Pride Oil Co. t
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Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 183, .370 P. 2d 355, which held
u11constitutional a statute restricting the size and location of
signs ach-ertising gasoline, would indicate that the challenged
statute closing motor vehicle dealers on Sundays also is
unconstitutional. Apparently appellant is unable to distinguish between an arbitrary and capricious statute restricting
the size and location of signs advertising gasoline, and an industry-wide Sunday closing law which reduces one or more
hazards to safety, public welfare and health. In the Pride
Oil case this Court declared that:

"when, in the judgment of the Legislature, it appears
to be necessary for the protection for some more important interest of the public which involves safeguarding its health, morals, safety or welfare, even those basic
personal rights may be limited to the extent necessary
to so protect the public interest."
Appellant makes the unwarranted contention that respondents admitted that "the closing of automobile dealers
on Sundays would not accomplish the legislative reason for
its enactment - the prevention of automobile thefts." Respondents made no such admission at any time. As hereinafter detailed, a substantial portion of the evidence which
illustrates the propriety and constitutionality of the challenged legislation was furnished by Dodge Town's own witnesses.
Although the publishers of Utah Code Annotated 1953
and the pocket supplements, treated Senate Bill No. 128
as part of the Criminal Code, and assigned thereto Secs.
76-.55-5, 6 and 7, the statute actually supplements the Motor
Vehicle Code, Title 41, particularly Chapter 3. The statute is
amply justified as a means of reducing or preventing a number of hazards to safety, health and public welfare.
1. Reduction of hazards of auto thefts: It was stipulated
at the request of plaintiff that the offices of County Recorder,
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Secretary of State, and
Vehicle Registration Division
of the State Tax Commission, are open only non-holiday
week days,
to Fridays from 8:30 a.m. until 5:00
P.M. ( R. 327-328). The offices where titles are registered
and liens recorded to motor 'ehicles are closed all day Sundays, Saturdays and various legal holidays. Contrary to the
argument of appellant on page 8 of its brief, John Burt, director of the Motor Vehicle Business Administration of the
State Tax Commission, did not admit that a "sale on Friday
night or Saturday, is even worse than a Sunday sale." The
division of which
Burt is director is charged with enforcement of the Motor Vehicle Code, to issue licenses to
motor vehicle dealers and salesmen, and to investigate complaints of fraud and stolen vehicles. There are 10 employees
working under him. There are six investigators including
himself. His office investigates thefts, theft rings, and fictitious titles. He has had fifteen years experience.
Mr. Burt testified without contradictions that most stolen
automobiles are sold through automobile dealers because of
the opportunity to get finance immediately. ( R. 366-368).
He said that there is a relationship between closing down
the sale of motor vehicles on Sunday and the investigation
and apprehension of auto thefts. He said that the more time
the unscrupulous person has to operate without investigation
because the State offices arc closed, the more time he has to
escape detection. When dealers are open on Sundays there
is that much more time for professional auto thieves and unauthorized auto dealers to operate while the investigatire
offices are closed, and more time to escape detection in
dealing with stolen automobiles. ( R. 368-370). Mr. Burt
testified that staying open on either Saturday or Sunday
gives a thief more time to operate when State offices are
closed. He said that if the dealerships are closed down on
one of those two days so that a sale or an exchange cannot
be made, it reduces the theft hazard. ( R. 373-376).
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2. Safety hazards involved in Sunday sales: It is undisputed that service departments of motor vehicles are
closed on Sundays, even at Dodge Town, and mechanics are
not available on Sundays to inspect or service or repair
motor vehicles. Generally, the service departments where
111cchanics service and work on motor vehicles are open during the hours of 7 or 8 A.M. to 5 or 6 P.l'vf. during week days.
Donald K. Richards, manager of Dodge Town, so testified.
The sales departments are not only open during those hours,
but also in the evenings during week days. At Dodge Town
the sales department has not only been open on week-days
until 10 P.M., but also all day on Sunday until 10 P.M. Mr.
Richards explained that if a vehicle is sold on Sunday his
company generally invites the buyer to come back on Monday after it has been serviced, to pick it up. ( R. 338-339).
The implication is that some buyers do take delivery on
Sundays of motor vehicles sold on Sundays when there are
no mechanics on duty to inspect and service those vehicles.
Those vehicles which are not given the required state inspection and mechanical adjustments necessary to insure
safe operation, are either actual or potential traffic hazards.
On page 11 of Appellant's Brief reference is made to a
"traffic survey" for Dodge Town conducted by Robert 0.
Bennett, Salt Lake City police officer. True, he testified that
traffic was lighter around automobile agencies on Sundays
thau on week days, and that traffic was heaviest on Satur<lays. He did not attempt to find out the real reasons why
automobile dealers in Salt Lake City were closed on Sundays. That evidence was unwittingly supplied by the manager of Dodge Town, who admitted that he knew that for
1.5 years Salt Lake City has had an ordinance prohibiting
motor dealers from selling on Sundays. ( R. 343). (Sec. 202.5-3, Revised Ordinances, Salt Lake City, 1965, R. 259-A).
Richards said he did not pay much attention to that
ordinance; that he had made sales on Sundays within the
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past two or three years; that other dealers at times made
sales on Sundays; and that the ordinance was treated as a
"joke". ( R. 340-342, 344-345).
There was no proof offered to show that if dealers were
open for business generally on Sunday in Salt Lake City and
other heavily populated areas there would be no traffic congestion on Sunday. The "traffic survey" conducted for Dodge
Town apparently was designed to offer some token resistance to the reasoning in the case of Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71, 71, 127 A. 2d 566, cited on
page 10 of Appellant's Brief. On page 11 appellant cites
Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. v. Erbe, 105 N. W. 2d 650, which
is squarely in point with the instant case, but appellant
attempts to distinguish that case by arguing that because
the sales departments are open week-days after the hours
when the repair and service departments have closed and
mechanics have gone home, "closing on Sundays and leaving
sales rooms open at other times when mechanics are not on
duty does not reach the problem or remove the claimed evil."
Appellant quotes nothing from the Iowa case to justify such
contention. Appellant says in substance that if the Legislature doe not enact a statute which will remedy all of the
problems of an industry it has no constitutional authority
to remedy any. Apparently, counsel for appellant see the
"handwriting on the wall" in reading the Iowa case, but attempt to erase it.
A hazard to safety on the highways is at least reduced by
closing automobile dealers on Sundays to prevent delivery
to purchasers on Sunday of vehicles which have not been
inspected nor serviced to meet the safety tests because there
are no mechanics on duty on Sundays.
3. Uncertainties as to acailability of liability insurance on
Sundays. Plaintiffs manager testified that if the insurance
agency is closed at the time an automobile is sold, his com-
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pany attempts to call the agent at home. He said it is the
same procedure if a sale is made after hours on Tuesday as
well as on Sunday. ( R. 3.38-339). He did not testify nor did
any other person show that liability insurance is always
a\'ailablc on Sunday. Appellant refers to the testimony of its
witness, John Norman Everett, assistant vice-president of
Heber J. Grant & Co., but fails to mention the admissions he
made on cross-examination which compel the conclusion that
it is not always posible to obtain liability insurance on Sundays. He testified that the insurance agency offices are closed
on Saturdays and Sundays; that some insurance agents are at
auto dealers; that agents can issue binders' after regular
hours and on Sundays; that an application for insurance can
be put in the mail, and on receipt at the insurance agency it
will be either accepted or rejected. ( R 322-324). Mr. Everett
admitted that there is no agent with every automobile dealer in Utah to write insurance; and that if a purchaser of a
new automobile does not get his application for insurance in
the mail he would not be covered, even under the existing
arrangements. ( R. 325-327). Thus, according to plaintiff's
own insurance witness, if an automobile is sold and delivered on Sunday, independent of the unavailability of mechanics to inspect and service the vehicle, there is no certainty that the vehicle will be covered with liability insurance. Driving without liability insurance is one of the possible hazards of purchasing an automobile on Sunday and taking delivery on Sunday. Closing all dealers on Sunday helps
to reduced that hazard.
4. Health and welfare of salesmen: Mr. Richards testified
that while the service department closes down at 5:30 P.M.
on week days, the sales department stays open until 10 P.M.,
sometimes even later. Salesmen report at 9 A.M. Half the
sales force stays until 3 P. M. The other half generally comes
at 3 P.tvl. and stays until 10 P.M. Salesmen work seven days
a week, six hours a day. ( R. 350-352). Salesmen do not come
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under the wage and hour law. There is no overtime pay. If
a salesman works 50 or 60 hours a wc>ek there is no overtime
pay. J\fr. Richards <li<l not find out just how many hours per
week salesmen work at Dodge Town. ( R. .382-386). However, he admitted that on deposition he stated that the salesmen work as much as 48 hours a week. ( R. 352).

In the interest of the health an<l welfare of the salesmen
engaged in such a 'rat-race' se,·en days per week, one team
of salesmen competing against the other, it certainly is with- ,
in the police power of the State to shut down the business
one day a week, to provide a clay of rest and enable the salesmen to have some time with their families.
In assailing the Utah statute, except for inaccurate quotations of witnesses, the appellant Dodge Town makes some
of the same arguments aserted by the plaintiff in the Iowa
case of Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. v. Erbe, 105 N. W. 2d 650.
The Iowa statute prohibited sale of motor vehicles by dealers on Sunday, an<l a motor vehicle dealer challenged the
validity of the Iowa statute as an arbitrary and unreasonable
interference with plaintiff's business. Dodge Town seeks to
have the Court substitute its wisdom and judgment for the
decision of the Legislature as was attempted in the Io\\'a
case. In response to such type of argument the Supreme
Court of Iowa stated:
"It is elementary that the courts have no concern with
the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of the enactment of the legislature an<l may not interfere because of
any supposed lack of those elements in the legislation
under attack. This freedom from lack of responsibility for
what the legislature does is at times a comforting position for the judiciary, hut it has no further significance
here. The question we must determine is whether th;,
law-making body acted within its constitutional powers.
(P. 651).
0

0

0
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" " " " Regularly enacted laws are presumed to be
constitutional, and this presumption must be overcome
by one attacking a statute by proving its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt." ( P. 6.52).
The Iowa Supreme Court then made the following significant statements to show that the legislature acted within
its constitutional police powers:
" " " " This bill would amend the motor vehicle dealers licensing law to protect the public:
"' ( 1) from the hazards of driving in Sunday's highly
congested traffic unsafe cars purchased from dealers on
Sunday when mechanics are not on duty and state enforcement agents are not available for checking dealer
lots; and:
" ' ( 2) from the risks of being involved in the improper sale of a motor vehicle due to the inaccessibility
of essential legal documents on Sunday and, in some
cases, protective liability insurance. Thus this bill would
aid the commissioner of public safety in his enforcement
of the existing motor vehicle laws.' The plaintiffs introduced evidence which they think showed the invalidity
of the reasons given by the legislature. But before discuss_ing this phase of the question it is appropriate to
point out that we are not limited to those matters. If any
reasonable state of facts can be conceived which will
support the validity of the law, it is our duty to sustain
it; and it is plaintiff's duty to negative every conceivable
basis for upholding it." (Citing cases). ( P. 652).
The Iowa court then examined the specific arguments
made by the complaining automobile dealers and rejected
their contentions as unsound: "Turning then specifically to the attack on the questioned act because it unreasonably and arbitrarily interferes with the busineses of the plaintiffs, we must determine whether the reasons given by the legislature, or any
other conceivable state of facts, have been negatived by
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the plaintiffs by the required quantum of proof. Chapter
243 is unquestionably an attempted exercise of the police
power of the state and must he sustained as such or
overthrown as an arbitrary and unreasonable use of the
power. The concept of this power has been broadened
in later years. \Ve said, in Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, supra, at page 930 of 247 Iowa, at page 19 of
77 N. W. 2d: 'Formerly the police power was thought
to be limited to measures that promoted merely the public health, safety or morals. Its scope is now generally
recognized as much less restricted. It has repeatedly been
held to include at least the promotion of prosperity and
the general welfare.' 0 0 0 It is in the light of modern
authority that we must consider the act before us.
"The legislature said the act is needed because of the
danger arising from dri\'ing motor vehicles purchased on
Sunday when mechanics are not available. The plaintiffs
evidence shows that generally mechanics do not work on
Sunday. They counter this, however, by evidence that
they check all used cars coming to their lots and sell
them only when they are put in good condition for safe
driving. This, it seems to us, is a matter for the legislature
to weigh. There is evidence that many prospective purchasers of used automobiles prefer to drive them a short
distance before buying. Perhaps they choose to have
them checked by mechanics of their own selection. In
any event we cannot say the evidence of safety is so
conclusive the legislature had no reasonable basis for its
determination at this point.
"The legislati\'e conclusion that danger of fraud or
mistake might arise in Sunday sales of used cars because
county recorders' offices arc not open so that titles and
liens can be checked is likewise beyond our power to
hold as an arbitrary ancl unreasonable basis for the act.
All dealers in either new or used motor vehicles are required to first procure licenses from the state. Section
322.3, Code of 1958, I. C. A. But this is not a complete
guarantee against mistake, fraud or misrepresentation:
at least we cannot hold the legislature has been prmcd
to have been arbitrary and unreasonable in so concluding.
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vehicles are subject to conditional sales contracts,
mortgages, or tax liens of record. The Sunday buyer has
no opportunity to check this for himself; if the legislature thought he needs protection, it is beyond our power
to say it could not afford it." ( P. 652-653).
Dodge Town was unable to prove that every one can get
liability insurance on Sunday. The Supreme Court of Iowa
pointed out that the legislature made such assumption, and
that the plaintiffs did not overcome such assumption:
"So with the question of protective liability insurance.
It is the public policy of the state, as evidenced by the
Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, Chapter
321A, Code of 1958, I. C. A., that those who drive motor
vehicles upon the highways of the state shall be able to
respond in damages for the injuries they cause through
negligent or reckless operation. Commonly, the owner
of a vehicle protects himself and those whom he may
injure by public liability insurance. If he does not do so,
and he inflicts injuries for which he cannot pay, he is
denied the right to operate until he furnished evidence
of financial responsibility. The legislature assumed liability insurance might not be readily available on Sunday,
and we cannot say this assumption has been overcome
by the plaintiffs beyond reasonable doubt.
"These considerations would in themselves require a
holding that the act is not an arbitrary and unreasonable
regulation of plaintiffs' business. But other jurisdictions
have found additional reasons for upholding similar legislation. It has been said that, because of the highly competitive nature of the business, the high price of the
article being offered for sale and the limited number of
buyers, the 'unreasonable and competitive lust' of some
dealers forces all to keep their places open every day of
the week for long hours, and on Sunday; and this is
thought to be inimical to the public welfare. Gundaker
Central Motors, Inc. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71, 127 A. 2d 566,
572, appeal dismissed for want of a federal question, 354
U.S. 933, 77 S. Ct. 1.397, 1 L. Ed. 2d 153.3. This case was
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cited with approval in Tinder v. Clarke Auto Company,
238 Ind. 302, 149 N. E. 2d 808, 815. The Indiana Supreme Court there added some observations of its own
the need of mankind for a day of rest at regular
mtervals. In both the Gunclaker and Tinder cases the
courts of last resort of New Jersey and Indiana, respectively, upheld statutes prohibiting the sales of either new
or used motor vehicles on Sunday."
POINT II
THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE COMPLAINT
ABOUT "ARBITRARY CLASSIFICATION" AND
THAT ONLY LICENSED DEALERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM SELLING MOTOR VEHICLES
ON SUNDAY, WHEN IN FACT UNLICENSED
DEALERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM SELLING
MOTOR VEHICLES AT ANY TIME ON ANY DAY
OF THE WEEK.
Under Point II of Appellant's Brief it is contended that
"THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATES AGAINST LICENSED MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS BY REQUIRING THE LICENSED DEALER TO
CLOSE ON SUNDAYS, AND BY IMPOSING CRIMINAL
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS
OF THE STATUTE."
Throughout its brief appellant attempts to create the impression that only "licensed dealers" are prohibited from
selling on Sunday. Appellant repeatedly makes statements
contrary to the facts which imply that unlicensed dealers
can sell on Sundays without incurring any criminal penalty,
when the penalty is identical. For example, in the "Statement of Facts" on page 4, appellant declares:
"2. The statute does not prohibit everyone from selling licensed 'motor vehicles on Sunday.' The statute only
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prohibits licensed dealers from making such sales. No
one else is probihited from selling motor vehicles on
Sunday."
Similar misstatements of fact and of the law appear
throughout Appellant's Brief. On page 15 it is claimed that
"only licensed motor vehicle dealers are prohibited from
selling or offering to sell automobiles on Sunday." Such
contention contradicts the express provisions of the Motor
Vehicle Code, Title 41, Chapter 3. Sec. 41-3-6, U. C. A. 1953
as amended provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to act as a new
motor vehicle dealer, used motor vehicle dealer, motor
vehicle salesman " " " without having first procured
a license to be issued by the motor vehicle business administrator, as hereinafter provided."

Sec. 41-3-7 as last amended in 1965 defines a motor
vehicle dealer as anyone engaged in the business of selling
or exchanging new, or new and used, or used motor vehicles
and who buys and sells or exchanges three or more motor
'ehicles in any 12-month period. Secs. 41-3-12 and 13 relate
to licenses and fees. Sec. 41-3-27 imposes criminal penalties
for violation:
"Any person, firm or corporation who shall violate
any of the terms and provisions of this act or any rule
or regulation promulgated by the administrator under
the authority herein conferred upon him, or who shall
commit any offense in this act declared to be unlawful
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than
$75.00 nor more than $299.00, or by imprisonment in the
county jail for a period of not to exceed six months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment."
"Dealers" are those who sell or exchange at retail, three
or more motor vehicles within a 12-month period. Every
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dealer is required to have a license, and is expressly prohibited from selling or exchanging motor vehicles without a
license. Therefore, contrary to the argument of appellant,
an unlicensed dealer cannot lawfully sell, trade or exchange
any motor vehicle on Sunday. In fact, an unlicensed dealer
canot lawfully sell or exchange motor vehicles at any time
on Sunday or on any day of the week. The major premise
in the argument of appellant being contrary to fact, the
conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional because it
"discriminates against licensed motor vehicle dealers" is not
only invalid, but absurd. Since unlicensed dealers are already
subject to the maximum fine and imprisonment which can
be imposed on persons guilty of a misdemeanor by violating
the Motor Vehicle Code, Title 41, Chapter 3, whether they
sell on Sundays or any other day, the claim of "discrimination" against licensed dealers cannot be sustained.
The appellant on pages 15 to 16 of its brief claims that
"Everyone except licensed dealers may sell on Sundays and
the evidence shows that cars are extensively offered for sale
on Sundays by people and firms who are not 'licensed automobile dealers.'" In refutation of the inference that unlicensed dealers are permitted to sell on Sundays, the manager of Dodge Town admitted on cross-examination that he
did not know of any unlicensed motor vehicle dealer who
is permitted to sell vehicles in Utah. ( R. 354). Nor do Exhibits P-5a to P-5g show that automobiles "are extensively
offered for sale on Sundays" by any unlicensed dealers, as
contended by plaintiff.
Appellant claims discrimination in permitting private
individuals who are not classified as dealers to sell any day
of the week including Sundays. Inasmuch as a person becomes a dealer if he sells or exchanges within a 12-month
period more than two motor ,-ehicles, appellant is complaining about individuals who sell their private cars. In this age
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when there are two or more automobiles in the family
garage and in the driveway, the argument of appellant
amounts to saying that no one should sell his automobile
without a dealer's license or that the Legislature should
have included in the classification of motor vehicle dealers
every individual who owns an automobile and to have prohibited every person from selling an automobile on Sunday,
as done by the Nebraska Legislature. See Stewart Motor Co.
v. City of Omaha, 120 Nebr. 776, 235 N. W. 332. However,
the appellant should address its argument to the Utah Legislature, not to this Court. As pointed out by the Iowa Supreme Court in Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. v. Erbe, 105 N. W.
2d 650:
"The rule is thus stated in Dickinson v. Porter, supra,
at pages 400, 401 of 240 Iowa, at page 72 of 35 N. W. 2d:
'If there is any reasonable ground for the classification
0
0
0
and it operates equally upon all within the same
class, there is uniformity in the constitutional sense and
no violation of any constitutional provision invoked by
plaintiff.' Authorities in support are cited immediately
following. Nor is it sufficient that the court may regard
the reason for the classification as weak, or poor, or that
the differences upon which it is based are not great
or conspicuous. Dickinson v. Porter, supra, at page 401
of 240 Iowa, at page 72 of 35 N. W. 2d; 16 A C. J. S.,
Constitutional Law, 520, page 382.
As pointed out in the case of Mosco v. Dunbar, 135 Colo.
172, 309 P. 2d 581 at 583, a duly enacted statute is presumed
to be constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown, and
it is within the province of the Legislature to determine appropriate classifications, and also to enact an industry-wide
Sunday closing law. The court declared:
"Today the automobile has become a definite and
well-established part of our way of life; its use, operation,
manufacture, sale, license, registration, taxation, insur-
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ance, theft and many other related matters have received
special legislative recognition and attention. Certainly
the Legislature has treated the motor vehicle business as
a special type of busines. The public has accepted it as
such. \Vere we to hold that it is arbitrary and unreasonable action on the part of the Legislature to place motor
vehicle dealers in a classification separate and apart from
merchants in general, it would be to close our eyes to
reality. " " " ." ( P. 586).
The argument of appellant as to "discrimination between
persons of the same class" seems to echo a similar type of
contention made in State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d
920, in which case this Court laid down the constitutional
rules for appropriate classification. This Court stated that
the Legislature cannot be compelled to legislate as to all
persons or on every subject-matter. It was pointed out that
a classification is not unreasonable and arbitrary if there is
some basis for differentiation between classes with respect to
inclusions or exclusions, and the differentiation bears some
reasonable relation to valid objects to be accomplished by
the legislation. If a reasonable basis to differentiate those
included from those excluded from the operation of the lair
can be found, the act should be upheld. Dodge Town ignores
the real distinctions in the attempt to generalize the statute
into invalid legislation. Dodge Town disregards the overwhelming evidence because the evidence negatives each
and every one of its contentions.
In Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co., 238 Ind. 302, 149 N. E. 2d
808, in upholding a Sunday closing law as constitutional
which covered motor vehicle dealers, the Indiana Supreme
Court said:
" " " " The making of classifications in the exercise
of police power is a matter of public policy and therefore
in the first instance it is the province of the legislature to
determine what clasifications are reasonable in Yiew of
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the purpose to be accomplished. This Court may not
substitute its judgment on such question for that of the
legislature, unless the classification is so manifestly arbitrary as to leave no room for reasonable minds to differ
on the subject. " " "." ( 149 N. E. 2d 812).
The Indiana Supreme Court in 149 N. E. 2d at 815 noted:
"Because of this highly competitive situation and because of the fact that the automobile is a high-priced
article, with limited numbers of buyers, the operation
of such retail business on Sunday by any substantial
number of dealers forces other dealers to operate on
Sunday regardless of their personal desires in order to
maintain their competitive positions. During recent years
it is common for many of such businesses to operate not
less than 12 hours per day during the week and not less
than eight to ten hours on Sunday. Salesmen for such
establishments are customarily employed upon a commission basis only, which arrangement almost compels
them to work whenever the establishment is open and
especially on Sunday when special appeal is made for
customer traffic. " " " "
The hours at Dodge Town have been longer than those
referred to in the Indiana case, being 13 hours per day in the
sales department. The copies of Dodge Town radio and T. V.
advertising script, introduced as Exhibit D-6 ( R. 124-154,
3845), show that the advertising devices emphasized the
fact that Dodge Town was open on Sundays and in the evenings. The Indiana court further stated ( p. 816):
"" " " What are the distinctly adverse effects of the
Sunday operation of such businesses upon the persons
who engaged in the business, and upon society generally, as related to the purpose of the law? We have already discussed the position in which the proprietors of
establishments which sell automobiles at retail and their
salesmen find themselves with respect to Sunday closing.
Because of the character of the business and the manner
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in which it is conducted, those who would prefer not to
operate on Sunday find thcmseh es almost compelled to
do so in order to maintain their competitive position and
all who operate on Sunday do so under mental and nervous strain. Both situations are inimical to the concept
which is the purpose of the law, " " "."
As to the basic claim that plaintiff was "singled out" and
"irreparably injured," plaintiff refuted the allegations of its
complaint, because its manager admitted that during May
and June 1969 when Dodge Town was closed on Sunday,
every other dealer also was closed on Sunday; and that none
of plaintiff's competitors got any of the sales plaintiff was
unable to make on Sundays. (R. 361-362). The claim that
plaintiff would suffer great loss and injury if not permitted
to operate on Sunday is absurd. The argument of plaintiff
implies that if a person canot buy an automobile on Sunday
he will not buy one any other day of the week. Obviously, a
person in the market for an automobile who cannot purchase
one on Sunday because the dealers are closed, is not going
to refrain from buying at all. He will purchase during one
of the other days of the week when dealers are open for
business. Likewise, if dealer agencies are closed at 8 p.m.
on week days, prospective purchasers will come in at an
earlier time.
Wholesalers are closed on Saturdays and Sundays. That
does not prevent retailers from purchasing or taking delirery of motor ,-ehicles during one of the five days of the week
when wholesalers and warehouses are open for business.
Dodge Town cites the Florida case of Kelley v. Blackburn, 95 So. 2d 260, wherein a Sunday closing law was declared unconstitutional. The statute prohibited the sale of
"any wares, merchandise, goods or chattels on Sunday." The
plaintiffs in the Iowa case cited that same case and argued
that selling cars at retail is not different from sales in other
businesses. Howe\ er, the Io\rn Supreme Court declared:
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"But we think there is a clear distinction and that
it is pointed out by the reasons set forth in our discussion
under Division II above. Thus, other businesses are not
subject to the need for services of, or inspection by, a
qualified mechanic. The danger of mistake or fraud
arising from inability to check titles or liens is not generally present in other businesses; nor do they as a rule
need the protection of public liability insurance."
There is another serious fallacy in the argument of appellant on pages 13 to 15. Appellant cites provisions of the
Motor Vehicle Code, Title 41, Chapter 1, which deal with
licensing of motor vehicles, not with licensing of dealers
covered in Chapter 3. Of course, the State in the exercise of
its police power can require a license on any vehicle which
operates on the highways. Appellant attempts to argue discrimination into the challenged statute prohibiting Sunday
sales by licensed dealers, by contending that the licensing
of vehicles only relates to those which use the highways,
and that exemptions are granted to vehicles which do not use
the highways and only occasionally cross a public road. The
appellant attempts to read into the challenged statute some
exceptions which are not contained in the statute at all.
Dodge Town refers to exceptions from registration of vehicles in Title 41, Chapter 1, including farm machinery. On
page 14 appellant contends that a truck or jeep, motorcycle
or Tote-Cote or trail bike which is to be used for off-highway purposes "need not be registered, and therefore, can be
sold on Sunday under the statute." What may be exempt
from cehicle license under Chapter 1 does not alter the fact
that no such exceptions are set forth in the statute assailed
by plaintiff and appellant. A licensed motor vehicle dealer
is not permitted under the language of Sec. 76-55-6, U. C. A.
195:3 (motor vehicle dealer Sunday closing law) to "carry
on or engage or represent or advertise that he engaged or
intends to engage in the business of buying, selling, exchang-
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ing, dealing in or trading in new or used motor vehicles at
retail;" or to "open any place of business or lot where he
attempts to or does engage in" such business on Sunday.
Any one who has had experience in attempting to obtain an
exemption from registration of a Tote-Cote or other vehicle
not intended for highway use, knows or should know that
the exemption from registration cannot be obtained on Sunday because the State Motor Vehicle Department is not
open. Furthermore, a person cannot purchase one on Sunday
because dealers are not allowed to have their place of business relating to motor vehicles open on Sunday. Again appellant attempts to read into the challenged laws some exceptions which are not contained in the statute in order to offer
a futile argument of unconstitutionality on some non-existent
ground of "discrimination."
On page 18 the contention is made that there is discrimination in "singling out the automobile industry" inasmuch
as real estate sales are not prohibited on Sunday. It is pointed
out that Sunday is the biggest sales day of the week for real
estate, and titles to real estate are recorded in the office of
county recorder, so that search of the offices where liens are
recorded canot be made on Sunday because those offices are
closed. Such argument should be addressed to the legislature.
The Legislature is not compelled to classify real estate with
the automobile industry. There are some inherent differences
which are obvious: (a) Automobiles are personal properties,
while land is real property. ( b) Automobiles in good working order are readily movable from one state to another,
whereas land is permanently fixed in its situs. ( c) Automobiles depreciate rapidly and seldom have an existence in
excess of 10 years, whereas only the improvements on the
land depreciate and then at a much slower rate. Even Burt
L. Curtis, the real estate broker who was called to testify
for plaintiff, admitted that he regarded the real estate business an as entirely different business from the motor vehicle
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business. ( R. 308-309). The Legislature has wisely classified
the automobile business as a separate and distinct industry,
as shown by the Motor Vehicle Code. The statute under
review actually supplements the Motor Vehicle Code.

POINT III
THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS A GENERAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO THE ENTIRE STATE OF
UTAH, NOT A SPECIAL LAW OFFENSIVE TO
THE CONSTITUTION.
Under Point III in Appellant's Brief it is argued that
"THE STATUTE VIOLATES THAT PART OF SECTION
18 OF SECTION 26 OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: 'IN
ALL CASES WHERE A GENERAL LAW CAN BE APPLICABLE, NO SPECIAL LAW SHALL BE ENACTED.'"
The appellent attempts to make the statute a special law
applicable only to licensed dealers, and one which would
allow unlicensed dealers to operate on Sunday. The premise
for appellant's argument is invalid, because another statute,
Sec. 41-3-6 prohibits unlicensed dealers to operate either on
Sunday or any other day of the week. Appellant seeks to detach the statute from all other statutes to create a special
law and to discriminate between members of a class. Appellant cites State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414, which
contains the following quotations from 25 R. C. L. 814:
"Constitutional law - what are general laws. Laws
which apply to and operate uniformly upon all members
of any class of persons, places or things requiring legislation peculiar to themselves in the matters covered by the
laws in question, are general and not special."

In that case this Court held that the liquor law declaring
certain activities to be a common nuisance "operates uni-
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formly throughout the entire territorial limits of the State
of Utah" and is not unconstitutional. This Court also held
that "an attack on the validity of the statute cannot be made
by parties whose interests have not been, and are not about
to be prejudiced by the operation of the statute."
The statute in question does have uniform operation
throughout the State. Dodge Town attempts to detach the
questioned statute from Sec. 41-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, and to read
into the questioned statute language not used by the Legislature in order to fit plaintiff's charges that there is discrimination and special treatment within the class of motor vehicle dealers by closing down licensed dealers. However, at
the trial plaintiff's manager admitted that he did not know
of any unlicensed dealer who is permitted to sell vehicles in
Utah. ( R. 354). That admission destroyed the unproven
claim of "irreparable injury" as well as the claim of discrimination within the class.
On pages 21 to 25 of its brief appellant refers to Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 939, and Gronlund
v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P. 2d 464, in its argument that the statute closing licensed motor vehicle dealers
on Sunday is a special law, and therefore unconstitutional.
This Court did not declare the statute and ordinance held
unconstitutional in those two cases a "special law." Both
cases involved a "general Sunday closing law." This Court
held that such statutes would be upheld as constitutional,
unless there are arbitrary and unreasonable exemptions and
exceptions. In State v. Soper, 25 Utah 318, 71 P. 482, it was
held that the exceptions allowable in a general Sunday closing law are "works of necessity and charity." In the two cases
held unconstitutional, instead of permissible exceptions of
"charity and necessity," there were arbitrary and inconsistent exceptions which discriminated between members of
the same class. Under the exceptions in one case a man could
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purchase for himself on Sunday a can of beer, which is not
a necessity, but he could not purchase for his child a can of
orange juice which might be a necessity. In both cases certain items were exempted which bore no relationship to
"works of charity and necessity." The statute and the ordiuance in those two cases were unconstitutional on their face.
In Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, this Court pointed out
that an industry-wide Sunday closing law such as one prohibiting sales of automobiles on Sunday can be enacted
without Leing held unconstitutional, citing Stewart Motor
Co. v. City of Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N. W. 332. That
case has not been overruled. Appellant attempts to distinguish that Nebraska case from the Utah statute on the
ground that an individual in Utah is not prohibited from
selling his own automobile on Sunday. An individual who
sells his own car does not thereby engage in a 'business'',
unless he sells more than two vehicles within a year. The
Legislature certainly has the constitutional authority to
classify those who are engaged in a business, for purposes
of regulation, from individuals not in the business. A sale
by an individual of his own automobile may be regarded as
an isolated sale.
On page 20 of its brief appellant cites McKaig v. Kansas
City, 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S. W. 2d 815, in which a Misouri
statute prohibiting the sale of motor vehicles on Sunday
was declared unconstitutional. As indicated by the Iowa
Supreme Court in Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. v. Erbe, supra,
the l\Iissouri constitution contains a 'peculiar provision " " "
which made the question of whether a statute or ordinance
was a special or general one a judicial question." It was
pointed out by the Missouri Supreme Court that only
Missouri, Minnesota, Kansas and Michigan have constitutions containing such provision. However, the Michigan
Supreme Court in Irishman's Lot v. Cleary, 338 Mich. 662,
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62 N. W. 2d 668, held a similar statute to be constitutional.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Rosenbaum v. City and
County of Denver, 102 Colo ..530, 81 P. 2d 760, and in Mosko
v. Dunbar, 13.5 Colo. 172, 309 P. 2d 581, held that the challenged Sunday closing legislation relating to motor vehicle
dealers is constitutional.
Dodge Town cites the case of Killingsway v. Westway
Motors, 347 P. 2d 1098, as an example of a statute held unconstitutional. That case decided by the Arizona Supreme
Court did not involve any Sunday closing. The questioned
statute required automobile dealers to have a particular kind
of building and display room. Such requirement imposed a
financial burden on the entire industry without any reasonable purpose to be served.
On page 27 appellant argues that "No reasons of health,
morals, safety, comfort or welfare dictate that the Sunday
sales of automobiles by a licensed dealer" should be banned.
In so arguing, appellant ignores some of the evidence and
admissions produced by its own witness. Dodge Town is
unable to point to any finding of fact which is not amply
supported by competent evidence because its own witnesses
compelled some of those findings.
The contention that the statute "is not general in its op·
eration, applying equally to all in need of rest and recupera·
tion," amounts to an attack upon the classification made by
the legislature, for the statute is general in its operation and
applies equally to all members of the class of license<l dealers. Unlicensed dealers for many years have been barred
from engaging in business any of the seven days of the week
The failure of the Legislature by S. B. 128 of 1969 to pro·
hibit sales, trades and exchanges on Sundays by unlicensed
dealers could not constitute discrimination between motor
vehicle dealers, for unlicensed dealers already were pro·
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hibited for selling, trading and exchanging motor vehicles
011 Sunday and every other day of the week. Contrary to the
implications of appellant's arguments, the statute in question does not permit unlicensed dealers to sell, trade or exchange motor vehicles on Sunday.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT
HAS BEEN OR WILL BE DEPRIVED OF ANY
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
AND ALSO FAILED TO PROVE THAT THE
STATUTE IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF THE
POLICE POWER TO REGULATE AN INDUSTRY
IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY, HEALTH, WELFARE AND REDUCTION OF HAZARDS OF MOTOR VEHICLE THEFTS.
Under Point IV of its brief the appellant makes the
dogmatic assertion that "THE STATUTE VIOLATES SEC.
7 OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH IN THAT IT DEPRIVES PLAINTIFF
OF HIS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW
BY SINGLING OUT PLAINTIFF'S BUSINESS AND LIMITING PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO VEND AND SELL
AND THAT SAID ACT IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE
OF THE POLICE POWER, AND HAS NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE PROBLEMS OF HEALTH AND WELFARE." In making such declarations the plaintiff does not
attack any finding of fact, nor point to any evidence to support such argument.
There is no evidence that the statute "singles out plaintiff's business." Plaintiff's manager admitted that it not only
c:losed down his business of selling motor vehicles on Sunday, but all of his competitors as well. There is no evidence
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th::it the statute deprives plaintiff or any one else of anv
property "without due process of law." The law does m;t
suppress plaintiff's business nor the business of any other
motor vehicle dealer. The statute merely regulates, by restricting and limiting the times when automobile dealers
may sell, trade and exchange vehicles to the six days of the
week other than Sunday. The act in question does not stop
the plaintiff from buying or selling motor vehicles. It merely ,
prevents those transactions on Sunday. Because the wholesalers do not operate on Saturdays and Sundays, plaintiff
cannot get vehicles on those two days. The limitation on the
time when sales can be made does not prevent plaintiff from
selling the same number during the six days of the week ,
other than Sunday.
Plaintiff's manager admitted that during the times when
Dodge Town was closed on Sunday, none of its competitors
got any of the sales plaintiff was unable to make on Sunday.
( R. 361-362).
Nor does the statute "single out" plaintiff from other licensed dealers and give other dealers more favorable treatment. What plaintiff would like is to have all of its competitors closed on Sunday and grant plaintiff the right to
operate on Sunday; but that would be discrimination. If
plaintiff had been "deprived of property" it would have presented evidence to that effect. There was no such proof. In
limiting plaintiff's right to sell, trade and exchange to the
six days other than Sunday, the statute imposes the same
restriction on plaintiff's competitors and all other motor
vehicle dealers who have procured a license to engage in
such business.
The State is entitled to require motor vehicle dealers to
procure a license to engage in the business and to folloll'
rules and regulations which are reasonable and in the inter- '
est of safety, health and welfare. The statute under attack
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actually supplements the Motor Vehicle Code. The statute
protects the purchaser by prohibiting Sunday sales when
there can be no title examination, no vehicle inspection and
no mechanical servicing to render the vehicle safe for use
on the highways. There is no certainty that public liability
insurance coverage can be obtained on Sunday .. Since salesmen work long hours each week on a commission basis without any right of overtime pay, and they are placed in competition with each other, the statute as least incidentally
promotes their health and welfare. The contention that the
statute is not a valid exercise of the police power disregards
the undisputed evidence.
The case of Smith v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 34 S. Ct. 681,
682, quoted by appellant on page 28, does not in its context
hold that the State may not impose reasonable regulations
on a business. Freedom of speech and of religion are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment as well as by the First
Amendment, but such constitutional protection does not
foreclose the State from imposing reasonable regulations for
safety and order under its police power. As pointed out in
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L.
Ed. 1213, 128 A. L. R. 1352:
"It is equally clear that a state may by general and
nondiscriminatory legislation regulate the times, the
places and the manner of soliciting upon the streets and
of holding meetings thereon; and in other respects safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the community without unconstitutionally invading the liberties
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
The United States Supreme Court rejected the contention that the State is powerless to regulate religious activities
upon the streets or to restrict the hours when such activities
might be conducted on public property. The Court distinguished between the unconstitutional requirement to obtain a license to conduct religious activities (which would
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imply a power to prohibit such religious activities altogether), and legislation which reasonably regulates the time1
when religious meetings and other religious activities mav
be held on public streets to insure peace, safety and good '
order.

POINT V
PLAINTIFF-APPELLENT NOT ONLY FAILED TO CARRY THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY, BUT ALSO FAILED
TO POINT TO ANY FACTUAL ERROR IN ANY
OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OR TO SHOW
LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THOSE FINDINGS AND THE JUDGMENT.
The trial court gave plaintiff Dodge Town, Inc., every
opportunity to present evidence to support the allegations ,
of its complaint. There not only was a failure of proof on
the part of the plaintiff, but plaintiff's own witnesses helped
prove substantial defenses. When plaintiff, by admission
and other evidence refuted its own claims the trial court
made findings against plaintiff. The trial court delayed
entry of the findings and judgment ( R. 280-286) to gi1e
plaintiff ample time to present any motion. A week after the
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment were
served, plaintiff made a "!vlotion for An Expanded Judgment" to obtain a ruling as to whether the 1969 statute "be·
came discriminatory in view of the new Common Day o!
Rest Act ( H. B. 8) since plaintiff would not have the right
of election of the Saturday closing and Sunday opening,'
and because violation of S. B. 128 would subject plaintifr
to criminal penalties, whereas the 1970 statute would •
merely subject plaintiff to an injunction. ( R. 267-278) ·
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Defendants traversed such motion on various grounds:
(a) Plaintiff sought an adjudication on the 1970 statute
without filing any action with respect to said 1970 law.
(b) The 1969 Sunday dosing of motor vehicle dealers supplements the Motor Vehicle Code, although placed in the
Criminal Code by the publishers of Utah Code, Annotated.
(c) Plaintiff has not stated that it desires to close on Satur<lay instead of Sunday "for the obvious reason that it would
be unprofitable for plaintiff to do so when the evidence
disclosed at the trial that over a period of 29 weeks the
Sunday sales aggregated only 98 vehicles, whereas the Saturday sales aggregated 215 or more than twice the Sunday
sales."
In the Appellant's Brief there is no showing of lack of
el'idence to support the findings of fact. Nor could there
be when plaintiff helped to produce that evidence by the
admissions of its own witnesses and exhibits.
In its Conclusion on pages 29 and 30, Dodge Town disregards a major portion of the undisputed evidence relating
to safety, health and welfare, by arguing that "There is no
compelling state interest shown in this case, except that
it assists the state in preventing fraud in dealing with automobile titles to prohibit sales on Sunday, when state offices
are closed." Reduction of fraud and theft would constitute
a valid purpose for the law. Plaintiff then concludes that
the statute does not eliminate or correct the evil "because
it does not prohibit sales of automobiles on Sunday by individuals or corporations who are not licensed dealers."
Plaintiff again ignores the fact that unlicensed dealers have
bceu and now are prohibited from engaging in business on
Sunday or any other day by the express terms of Sec. 41-3-6
of the Motor Vehicle Code.

Contrary to the facts and the law, plaintiff argues that
the statute permits "sales by everyone but licensed dealers."
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Plaintiff says the statute even permits wholesale sales,
(although the wholesalers do not operate on Saturdays or
Sundays). Plaintiff contends that "there is nothing which
can be said about the automobile industry and its activities
on Sunday that cannot be said with equal force as to many
other businesses, such as real estate sales, and sales of other
properties which the Legislature has not seen fit to regulate."
In the fable of the six blind men and the elephant, the men
could not distinguish the facts because they could not see
what was distinguishable to persons with good eyes. Plaintiff
simply ignores distinguishable facts and denies the constitutional power of the Legislature to determine reasonable
classifications for the purpose of regulation in the interest
of safety, health and welfare, and reduction of motor vehicle thefts.

,
'

;

,

CONCLUSION
The plaintiff and Dodge Town, Inc. not only failed to
carry the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the statute under attack is unconstitutional, but
plaintiff's own witnesses supplied some of the evidence
that the statute is constitutional and a proper exercise of the
police power of the Legislature to promote public safety,
security, health and welfare.
The arguments against classifying motor vehicle dealers
separately from other business enterprises, should be addressed to the Legislature. The appellant seeks to hm e this
Court substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature, and
to curtail the constitutional authority of the Legislature to
reasonably regulate industry for the protection of the public.
The appellant assails the statute as discriminatory against
licensed motor vehicle dealers, claiming that only licensed
dealers are prohibited from selling on Sunday, although un-

1
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licensed dealers are prohibited from selling and exchanging
not only on Sunday, but throughout all of the other days of
the week by the terms of Secs. 41-3-6 and 7, U.C.A. 1953.
Appellant also complains that individuals are permitted to
sell their own motor vehicles, and argues in substance that
it is unfair for the Legislature not to prohibit individuals
from selling their own private automobiles on Sunday. The
Legislature has regulated an entire industry by the Motor
Vehic:le Code. According to the statutory definitions a person
is not classified as a dealer until he sells more than two
1ehicles in a 12-month period. Appellant attempts to read
iuto the statute a non-existing exemption to permit Sunday
sales of motor vehicles which can be exempted from license.
No such exception appears in the questioned statute. Chapter 1 of Title 41 pertains to the licensing of the vehicle, not
the licensing of any dealer. An exemption from a vehiclelicense cannot be procured on Sunday or on Saturday or any
other day when the State department is closed.
The challenged statute supplements the Motor Vehicle
Code. It is true that the statute does not cure every possible
evil. The Legislature is not inhibited in legislating and in
classifying businesses for purposes of regulation, just because it may be unable to remedy every evil. The Legislature
is not required by one single statute to curb every possible
danger to public safety, health and welfare, which might
be the subject of legislation. Legislative progress does not
generally come in one step. It is achieved in many steps and
in varying degrees over a period of years.
The statute under consideration is an industry-wide
regulation. The alleged exceptions asserted by appellant are
non-existent. Nor is the statute special legislation which
singles plaintiff out of a reasonable classification and takes
plaintiff's property without due process. The statute applies
to plaintiff and all of its competitors alike. The claims of
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"irreparable injury" to plaintiff proclaimed by the complaint
and several affidavits, all were devoid of substance, and
plaintiff's manager finally admitted he had no records to
prove such claims.
The statute does not destroy the business of any licensed
motor vehicle dealer. When people cannot purchase on
Sunday they will purchase on other days of the week when
dealers are open for business. Plaintiff's own admissions
on cross-examination showed that plaintiff suffered no actual
injury, only imaginary distress. The statute treats all persons
within the classification on equal terms. There are no ex·
ceptions nor exemptions. The appellant has presented no
facts nor legal reasons for reversal of the judgment.
The statute is a valid exercise of the constitutional power
of the Legislature to regulate the motor vehicle business in
the interest of safety, security, health and welfare. The final
judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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